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In 96 A.D., Emperor Domitian was assassinated by a group organized
by his chamberlain Parthenius.1  Although Domitian had numerous
supporters in the army, Suetonius records that the political establishment of
the time did not feel any great sympathy for the murdered Domitian: 
The Senators on the contrary were so overjoyed, that they raced to fill the
House, where they did not refrain from assailing the dead Emperor with the
most insulting and stinging kind of outcries.  They even had ladders brought 
and his shields and images torn down before their eyes and dashed upon the 
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ground.  Finally they passed a decree that his inscriptions should everywhere be 
erased, and all record of him obliterated.2  
These initial attacks upon the images and symbols of Domitian were the
first stages of a legal damnatio memoriae against him. 3 The damnatio 
declared that the memory of Domitian would be stricken from the history of
Rome.  His edicts and words were not to be given legal force; his images 
and symbolic legacy were to be extirpated.4  The damnatio was intended 
to erase Domitian, insofar as that was possible, from what was taken as a 
history of glory and rightful rule.5  The extent to which this was possible,
even in first century Rome, should not be overstated; the reality of
Domitian’s rule was not, and could not be, literally removed from memory.
Suetonius, after all, wrote down both the fact of the damnatio and the
reasons why it was appropriate.6  The goal of the damnatio, instead, was
to make that memory shameful—to invert the respect given to the deified
rulers that had studded the past of Rome and that now formed the stock 
of rhetorical reference points that could be used in Rome’s present
governance.7 The damnatio, in short, was intended as a political statement
about the future of the Roman people and that this future should 
emphatically not include any reference to the aberrant acts and ideas of
emperors such as Domitian.8 
These ideas are not obviously relevant to the discussion of international 
criminal law.  International criminal law is often understood as fulfilling 
the function of offering up a place for memory, rather than for forgetting 
and for shame.9  Instead, I want to defend the idea that one powerful 
justifying explanation for some forms of international criminal law is as 
a sort of modern-day damnatio memoriae, in which the memory of the
acts and ideas of those who have transgressed against basic moral norms
is to be extirpated from political memory.  Not, I should say again, literally; 
the function of criminal law here is not to hide the memory of evil or the
2. Id. at 361. 
3. See ERIC R. VARNER, MUTILATION AND TRANSFORMATION: DAMNATIO MEMORIAE 
AND ROMAN IMPERIAL PORTRAITURE 111 (2004) (summarizing Domitian’s reign and the 
senate’s decision to “abolish his memory”). 
4. See SUETONIUS, supra note 1, at 361; VARNER, supra note 3, at 111. 
5. SUETONIUS, supra note 1, at 361; VARNER, supra note 3, at 111. 
6. See SUETONIUS, supra note 1, at 356–58, 360–61. 
7. See VARNER, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the practice of damnatio memoriae 
and its intended purpose); see also Sarah E. Bond, Op-Ed., Erasing the Face of History, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK8 (discussing Egypt’s removal of all images of ousted
president Hosni Mubarak and the historical practice of erasure in Egypt and Rome).
8. See VARNER, supra note 3, at 111.  For a discussion of the damnatio and its 
functions, see John Pollini, 88 ART BULL. 590 (2006) (reviewing VARNER, supra note 3). 
9. See, e.g., LUDOVIC HENNEBEL & THOMAS HOCHMANN, GENOCIDE DENIALS AND 
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corrupt rationales of those who committed it.  The function is, instead, to
remove certain ideas and persons from the stock of received reference
points that can be cited in ordinary democratic politics in the future.  The 
goal of international criminal condemnation, on this view, is democratic 
in nature, and it functions by limiting the space of those ideas and
references that can be put forward in public without civic shame. There 
are, after all, ideas and persons, events and histories, that can be cited as 
justifying reasons within any democratic community, and those that 
cannot. Lawyers cite Brown v. Board of Education; they tend to avoid
justifying their claims with reference to Dred Scott. Politicians—whether 
left or right—find homes for their ideas in the words of Winston Churchill; 
comparatively fewer look for antecedents in the ideas of Neville 
Chamberlain.  The function of the modern damnatio is to limit forever 
the stock of persons and ideas that can be put forward in a political
community, by making certain persons and certain ideas damned and 
damnable.  When international criminal law condemns criminals on this 
account, it does so not because the persons involved deserve to be 
punished—although, on the account I give here, they certainly do not 
deserve to be free from that punishment.  Nor does it punish because 
such punishment will directly incentivize future would-be war criminals 
into rethinking their plans.  International criminal law, on my account, is
justified with reference to the future democratic deliberations of the
political community that is to be constituted in part by the legal
deliberations of that criminal tribunal.  We punish, on this account, 
because punishment here communicates a message to future democratic 
participants, and that message is one of shame—of what should never 
again be spoken of as anything other than shameful.
It follows, on this account, that the possible explanations for why 
international criminal law is justified—when it is justified—might go 
considerably further afield than conventional accounts of the justification of
punishment.  The function of international criminal law, on my account,
is constitutional, in a way that most ordinary forms of legal punishment
are not. The punishment we offer in the international case is one that
involves the creation, in whole or in part, of a new legal community
emerging out of violence and evil.  The account of international criminal 
law I offer here involves a justification appropriate only to this context 
and makes the punitive aspect of international criminal law only 
indirectly relevant.  What we are doing in international criminal law is 























   
 
norms and the public norms surrounding how we are to use and interpret 
those legal norms.  As such, it is open to us to question whether punishment
in the ordinary sense is even a necessary part of international criminal law 
at all.
I will not, however, follow up this last suggestion in the present Article. 
For simplicity’s sake, I will assume that we are discussing in the present
context only one particular form of international criminal institution, the
International Criminal Court (ICC). I will further assume that we 
understand this court to have the nature, power, and jurisdiction—both
personal and subject matter—that it currently does.10  I would argue that 
the ICC might be justified as a sort of constitutional damnatio in three 
Parts. The first will discuss two ways of looking at the court and why
the conventional justifications of punishment might not be adequate to
justify what the court is doing.  The second will examine the issue of the 
politically unspeakable and argue that the court’s mandate might indeed
be the responsibility of making certain ideas and persons politically
shameful.  The final Part will try to give some justification for the claim 
that this mandate might give rise to a justification for the court’s existence.
On the account I provide here, even if the court could not be justified 
with reference to the traditional notions of punishment, it might not be 
wronging those it punishes; those who commit radical evil might have 
no claim to be free from being used in the constitutional process of political 
reconstruction. If this argument is correct, then those who are damned 
by the court may be legitimately used as sites on which the constitutional
history of the society in question is rebuilt; they are rendered shameful, 
and that shame may help build a new social world in which such
shameful acts and actors will not recur. 
I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF 
PUNISHMENT
There are at least two ways of justifying the practices and institutions
of international criminal law.  The first takes them as being continuous, 
in function and in justification, with domestic institutions of punishment. 
They may differ, of course, in their precise jurisdictional reach, or their 
powers, or their procedures. They are, on this view, akin in what makes
them justifiable; the moral test for one applies with equal weight to the 
other.  Call this the continuity view. The alternative, of course, is to think of
10. I will also be avoiding a discussion of the crime of aggression, which the ICC 
will eventually take up within its jurisdictional ambit. See Rome Statute of the
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these institutions as radically discontinuous, in aim and in justifying 
rationale.  What they are trying to do is sufficiently different, on this view, 
that we should not use theories developed to justify the one in the task of 
justifying the other.  We can call this, naturally, the discontinuity view.
I will defend, of course, the discontinuity view.  I want to examine the 
continuity view, though, and see if we can justify the ICC with reference 
to the same norms and ideas we use to justify domestic institutions of 
punishment.  We should be careful here to distinguish between a conclusion 
that the ICC is unjustified on these norms and ideas and the conclusion 
that such norms and ideas are not the appropriate basis for the evaluation 
of the ICC. I want to remain open to the possibility that the ICC is best
understood as a punishing institution much like a domestic court and 
that the ICC is right now not especially justifiable on the theories we use 
to justify domestic courts. Nevertheless, if we cannot justify the ICC on
these theories, I believe we have at the very least some reason to look 
elsewhere and see if some other sorts of theories give us a better chance
to show the ICC as justifiable. 
So, what sorts of reasons do we generally give to justify domestic 
punishment?  The canonical answer, of course, is to divide justifications 
into retributive and deterrence-based ones and then examine them both 
in turn.11  I think this distinction is often harder to make than we tend to
think; many people defend punishment with reference to future 
consequences for the protection of basic rights, a view that falls neither 
comfortably within the retributive line nor comfortably within the general 
description of utilitarianism and deterrence.12  We can, though, use this 
distinction as it stands and see how able we might be to use these ideas 
to justify what it is that the ICC is trying to do.  We can make these sorts 
of reasons more precise by making them describe what it is that makes
the punishment rightful in each case. The retributive theory says, we 
punish you because you deserve to be punished; there exist basic rules 
that determine what individuals are entitled to have, and insofar as you 
have transgressed against those rules, so shall we rightly transgress against 
11. See, e.g., Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution 
as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315–17
(2000) (discussing the relationships between retribution and the utilitarian justifications of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation). 
12. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and 





























those rules protecting you.13  The deterrent theory, in contrast, says, we 
punish you for our protection; the future will be a better one if rules 
protecting our interests or rights are in place, and the existence of the
pain of punishment is justified with reference to the greater protection
those interests or rights shall receive.14 
These thumbnail sketches are obviously subject to a great deal of 
interpretive detail, and different theorists will undoubtedly find much to 
disagree with in what I have just said.  I want to avoid these discussions, 
though, and focus instead on whether or not we could use these broad
outlines to justify international criminal law.  Is it plausible to think that
institutions such as the ICC are justified with reference to these ideas? 
We can start by looking at retribution.  The justification of the ICC 
would seem to be easily made with reference to retribution; those who 
commit radical evil, after all, have transgressed against the bodies and 
lives of others in a foundational way.  Surely we can justify the imposition
of harm against those persons with reference to the idea of some sort of 
reciprocity between the victim and aggressor, as retribution imagines. 
There are worries, though, about the use of retributive reasoning as a 
justification for the ICC as an institution. Legal punishment, after all, is 
not just a matter of one individual deciding, rightly or not, to cause harm 
to another in the name of justice. It is, instead, done from within a system of 
rules that state collectively what may justly be done and what shall occur
when these primary rules are violated.  Thus, a justified retributive 
system must be one in which there is fairness not simply between the 
victim and aggressor in the process of legal punishment but between
potential recipients of punishment in respect to allocation.  This may
prove to cause some problems before we can think of the ICC as justifiable 
as an instrument of retribution.  In the first place, fairness between potential 
subjects of retribution would seem to require that like cases be treated
alike. This is emphatically not the case in international criminal law. 
The United States, most notably, is functionally immune from international 
criminal procedure, both legally in virtue of its P-5 rights in the Security
Council and functionally in virtue of its military supremacy.15  What  
punishing actions the ICC has done have been uniformly directed against 
13. See Cotton, supra note 11, at 1317. 
14. See id. at 1316. 
15. See Richard Dicker, A Flawed Court in Need of Credibility, N.Y. TIMES (May 
21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/opinion/a-flawed-court-in-need-of-cred 
ibility.html (discussing perceived flaws in the administration of international justice due
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criminals from impoverished African nations.16  This is not, I should
emphasize, to impugn the court itself as unjustified; I do not want to say
that. I want to say only that the court is unlikely to be easily justified with 
reference to the norms of fairness implicit within the idea of retribution. 
I would further add that the retributive ideal places the notion of systemic
legal punishment within a wider framework of rights protection.17  This 
might impugn some domestic institutions of punishment, but it outright
damns the punitive practices of the international community, which exist
against a backdrop of inefficient collective response to atrocity, widespread
collaboration with exploitative and brutal regimes, and widespread refusal 
to accept any risk at all for the sake of foreign human rights protection.18 
On this view, we should be extremely hesitant before we seek to justify 
the ICC through the terms used to justify domestic legal institutions of 
punishment; these latter institutions tend to involve practices markedly
absent from the former, and to reduce the one to the other is to risk 
making the ICC less justifiable than it might truly be.19 
I do not want to overstate my conclusion here; it might be the case that
the ICC is best viewed as an imperfect but hopeful development and that 
it might one day become truly justified as a retributive institution. 
I believe this optimism is mistaken—the advantages of the United States
over the Central African Republic are unlikely to disappear any time
soon—but do not want to insist on the point too strongly.  I will, instead,
take these difficulties as reasons to think that the ICC might be understood
as doing something rather different from what domestic courts do. Before
examining that, though, we might look at the issue of deterrence.  Can
we not justify the practices of the ICC with reference to the consequential 
calculus of pain and benefit?  Pain is, after all, an unwelcome thing; if
16. Solomon Dersso, The International Criminal Court’s Africa Problem, AL 
JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201369851918549.html 
(last modified June 11, 2013, 8:03 PM). 
17. I have elsewhere defended the view that rightful punishment occurs only
against a backdrop of effective police services.  See Michael Blake, International Criminal
Adjudication and the Right To Punish, 11 PUB. AFF. Q. 203, 206, 209 (1997). 
18. See Michelle Kwon, The Inefficiency of International Justice, GEO. J. INT’L 
AFF. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012), http://journal.georgetown.edu/2012/04/18/the-inefficiency-
of-international-justice-by-michelle-kwon/ (discussing the apparent lack of deterrence 
and rehabilitation provided through the international justice system). 
19. These conclusions are echoed by Deirdre Golash, The Justification of Punishment 
in the International Context, in  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 201,

















    





threatened with pain, will the war criminals of the world not learn
somewhat better behavior?  If so, then the justification of the ICC might 
be continuous with the justification of domestic courts, at least when 
those courts are thought of as institutions of deterrence. Both the ICC 
and ordinary courts try to make the world a better place for potential 
victims, by making the world more uncomfortable for would-be abusers. 
The difficulty with this calculation, of course, is the same thing that is 
difficult about any real-world calculation involving complex institutions 
and multiple actors: we simply do not know a great deal about the likely 
effects of institutions such as the ICC.  This is a difference in degree,
rather than in kind, from domestic law; we are also often ignorant about
the effects of law, for example, the endless debates on the deterrent
effects of the death penalty,20 but more profoundly ignorant about the
likely results of novel institutions such as the ICC.  There are, moreover, 
reasons to think that the ability of the ICC to incentivize good behavior 
on the part of future war criminals is likely to be minimal at best.  In the
first instance, the simple fact of numbers is difficult to ignore.  The ICC 
has, as I write this, only one conviction, and the result of that conviction 
has been a sentence of fourteen years.21  Given the context in which many
war criminals exist—a context of social and institutional breakdown, 
ongoing violence and atrocity, and bloody competition for power and 
security—it is safe to say that the worry factor of a possible indictment
in The Hague may not be at the forefront of the criminal’s calculations. 
It is worthwhile to note that neither of the most high profile figures 
indicted by international tribunals—Slobodan Milošević and Muammar 
Gaddafi—was punished by the tribunal; Milošević died of natural causes,
and Gaddafi died from violence in the street.22  Potential war criminals 
are likely to see this trend and think—not unreasonably—that it is likely
to continue. 
20. Compare Richard B. Roper, The Death Penalty at the Intersection of Reality
and Justice, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 15, 18–20, 31 (2008) (arguing that the death penalty
serves as a valid deterrent), with Allan D. Johnson, Note, The Illusory Death Penalty:
Why America’s Death Penalty Process Fails To Support the Economic Theories of 
Criminal Sanctions and Deterrence, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1101, 1120–28 (2001) (arguing 
that the current death penalty appeals process eliminates any deterrent effect from capital 
punishment).
21. Thomas Escritt, Insight: International Court’s Credibility in Dock over Failed 
Prosecutions, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2013, 9:14 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03 
/19/us-warcrimes-court-credibility-insight-idUSBRE92I0I120130319. 
22. See Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-
01/11-01/11, Decision to Terminate the Case (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1274559.pdf; Kareem Fahim et al., Qaddafi, Seized by Foes, Meets a 
Violent End, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A1; Milosevic ‘Died of Natural Causes,’
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To the extent that the ICC does lead to a change in the calculation 
matrix of a given criminal, moreover, it is not clear that the change is
one we have reason to value.  Leslie Vinjamuri has argued that the threats
of the ICC may make the criminal more resilient by heightening the 
costs of transitioning away from power.23  It is not clear that such reasoning 
is true; Kathryn Sikkink has argued powerfully that those fears are
overstated.24  The main point here is that the justifiability of the ICC, on 
the deterrent picture discussed here, is at best undecided. We have reason to
think that the precise consequences of the ICC are difficult, if not 
impossible, to gauge with any degree of accuracy. This means that the
ultimate justification for the ICC is similarly indeterminate; we will not 
be able to rest easy with the institution’s viability until we are aware of
what changes it is actually likely to make. 
All this, of course, presupposes that the deterrent function of the ICC 
is a function we are morally permitted to exercise.  Deterrence in general,
though, reflects consequentialist ideas that many—myself included— 
find difficult to wholeheartedly endorse.25  It is one thing for us to say 
that the ICC actually does cause good results.  It is quite another for us
to think that we are permitted to achieve these results in this manner, by
using violence against these persons.  Imagine, for example, that the United 
States proposed using targeted drone strikes against suspected human
rights abusers in Africa.  Setting aside prudential worries about the
likelihood of the drone program being done well, I suspect many of us 
would be worried about the legitimacy of the program’s being undertaken at
all. Even if it were effective, it might be impermissible as a violation of 
the rights of those it proposed to kill.  I raise this not as a decisive objection 
to the deterrent theory of punishment—the theory has too much plausibility
to be dispelled that easily—but because it demonstrates that efficiency in
getting good results cannot be the only consideration in the justification 
of punishment.  This means, in turn, that many of the concerns discussed 
above under the heading of retribution—the fairness of the system that 
imposes the punishment, most notably, given the disparity between the 
23. Leslie Vinjamuri, Peace May Require Forgoing Justice, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/04/can-we-afford-to-forgive-atrocities/peace-may-
require-forgoing-justice (last updated Dec. 13, 2013, 11:39 AM). 
24. KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS
ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 26–27 (2011). 
25. See, e.g., David Dolinko, “Using Persons” and the Justification of Punishment, 38 





    
 





   
 
 











United States and the Central African Republic—may recur under the 
heading of deterrence. 
So, what to conclude?  I suspect the first conclusion is that the ICC is
not, right now, as easily justified as the institutions of domestic legal
punishment. That may not be the most interesting of conclusions.  I want to
go beyond it, though, and suggest that this should not be the final word
about the legitimacy of the ICC. On my view, the ICC is considerably 
more legitimate than the above picture might suggest.  As a way of 
motivating this, I want to briefly examine the idea that punishment is not 
simply harsh treatment, given as a way of either causing good conduct or
rewarding bad conduct.  It does not simply do something.  It does, instead, 
say something—it has propositional content.  When we punish, we do
not simply do a thing; we are, simultaneously, saying something as well. 
This idea is often associated with Joel Feinberg, who identifies it as 
the expressive function of punishment.26  On Feinberg’s analysis, the
institution of legal punishment does not simply involve the giving of an 
unwelcome consequence; many legal results, from fines to judgments in 
civil suits, have that character.  Legal punishment in the full-blooded 
sense, in contrast, brings with it both the unwelcome result and the sense
of public disapprobation.27 To simplify things somewhat, no one believes
that a parking ticket is intended to express the antipathy of the community 
toward the tardy parker, and no one believes that the tardy parker ought
to feel shame in virtue of some such judgment.  The sentence of
imprisonment, in contrast, does bring with it some notion that shame is 
appropriate and that a judgment legitimating such shame has emerged
from the process of adjudication.  Even a day’s worth of imprisonment,
said the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, was cruel and unusual 
as punishment for the “crime” of being an addict;28 Feinberg’s theory
explains this with reference to the fact that there, the stigmatization 
associated with legal incarceration was not legitimate.  Punishment, 
again, is not simply an unwelcome consequence but an act of speech.29 
Ideas like these seem to help explain what the ICC is trying to do and 
why it might be right to try to do it.30  The ICC, I have said, is an institution 
26. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 
400–03 (1965).
27. Id. at 401–02. 
28. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
29. Feinberg, supra note 26, at 402–03. 
30. Robert Sloane and David Luban express similar ideas about the function of 
the ICC. Luban defends the idea that the ICC should be seen as norm generating, and 
Sloane discusses the idea that the sentencing function of the court should be judged with
reference to the expressive function of the criminal law.  See David Luban, Fairness to 
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that is trying to damn the memory of wrongdoers.  If punishment helps 
in this process, then perhaps that is enough of a good reason to engage in 
punishment.  I believe these ideas are a good place to start, but I want to 
be careful. I do not think the expressive function of punishment is sufficient 
as a justification of punishment. Feinberg does not think it sufficient 
either—he identifies this as a function of an institutional practice that
must receive its justification elsewhere.31  If, in other words, we have this
institution in place, and if it is conventionally associated with the 
communication of messages, then we are able to examine these messages
and these conventions to see if they are morally appropriate.  It is not
enough for us to say that we are able to punish because that is how we 
send messages.  Many violent things communicate messages—from an
invasion to a hate crime—and we judge them in virtue of their violence 
and not solely in virtue of the rightness of their messages.
So, if we want to use the idea of an expressive function for punishment,
and if we want to explore this idea as a way of justifying the ICC, we
still have some questions to ask.  The first, and most obvious, is why we 
are not doing wrong in choosing a punitive message for communicating
our disapproving message.  Feinberg, after all, imagines a nonviolent 
ceremony of disavowal as a replacement for some parts of punishment; 
we might imagine the same for our treatment of war criminals.32  The  
second, and more vexing, is just what message it is that international 
legal process is trying to communicate.  To whom is the message addressed?
What is the message?  What, in short, does the ICC actually say?
I will address the former question in Part III.  For now, though, I want 
to examine the latter question and spend some time trying to figure out
how to understand the ICC as a discursive institution.  We can turn, then,
to the idea that there is a certain pattern of speech in any democratic
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 576–77 (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2010) (discussing the value of norm generating on the international 
landscape); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The 
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 88–91 (2007) (arguing that international sentencing should be 
undergone with criminal law’s expressive function in mind).  I do not want here to
disagree with either Sloane or Luban; I want instead to get slightly clearer on what sorts 
of norms we are trying to create and what sort of proposition the court is actually trying 
to communicate.
31. See Feinberg, supra note 26, at 423. 






















political community that is properly understood as part of that community’s 
constitutional structure. 
II. MORAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE REALM OF THE SPEAKABLE 
There are limits on speech in every community.  The limits are legal, 
in the first instance; even the United States—a comparative outlier in
free speech jurisprudence—brings legal force to bear against certain
forms of speech, including libel, slander, obscenity, and the like.  I am
not primarily concerned with these limits, interesting though they are. 
I am more concerned with the fact that each community has a set of 
ideas and concepts that can be invoked in public in the justification of 
political practice and a corresponding set of ideas and concepts that are 
anathema. The former set might be understood, without too much abuse, 
as extending outward from John Rawls’s concept of public reason, 
which he describes as involving the use of certain ideas that present in 
the “public political culture” of a well-ordered democratic society.33 
Rawls’s ideas here are simultaneously descriptive and normative; they
seek to guide the deliberations of a just democracy existing under 
circumstances of reasonable pluralism, and they depend for their 
plausibility upon the existence of a set of ideas that could be relied upon 
to recognize as politically appropriate.34 I am not here directly concerned
with Rawls’s arguments so much as I want to emphasize what Rawls did
not: the existence of ideas within the public political culture entails the 
existence of some ideas that are firmly and rightly regarded as outside 
that political culture. Rawls thought some of these ideas—nonpublic 
reasons stemming from comprehensive doctrines and sectarian views— 
had appropriate places within which they should be applied.35  He did  
not concern himself too greatly with the emotional reaction we might 
think reasonable to find when we encounter those reasons elsewhere. 
Rawls was, famously, a theorist of the reasonable.  But I think it is
plausible to think that one way we have of supporting Rawls’s vision is 
to think that some ideas are not simply private but unspeakable— 
unspeakable in public and in political life.  We recognize some of these 
reasons as being so likely to lead to the violation of basic rights and 
norms that the use of these ideas is rightly regarded as shameful, rather
than simply a violation of the norms of public reason. 
Those of us who live within democratic cultures learn the limits of the 
speakable, even if we feel no particular desire to say the things that are 
33. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 7–9, 212–13 (1993). 
34. See id. at 212–13. 
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politically unspeakable. We are all aware that there are reasons and
arguments that can be presented without shame, and those that cannot.  It 
is now, for instance, much less socially acceptable to be a simple gutter 
racist in public than it was in the 1960s.  Those people who are, in fact, 
racists find themselves compelled to alter at least what they say in public 
so that they are able to insist upon their own antipathy toward racism. 
This was the source, famously, of Henry Louis Gates’s rejection of hate 
speech laws: they punish only those racists lacking enough sophistication to
hide their racism.36  They punish, in other words, those who are both
racist and badly educated.37 
I do not want to celebrate this shift as a major accomplishment; the 
sophisticated racist is not morally superior to the gutter bigot.  But it is, 
politically speaking, a step forward, when arguments that simply refer to
the innate inferiority of a particular part of humanity no longer count as 
politically viable.  We are, I think, in the middle of a similar change in the
area of same-sex relationships.  Even as recently as the 1990s, homophobic 
legislation could be grounded in a simple aversion to same-sex desire. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor, in
contrast, identified simple antipathy toward homosexuals as an inadequate
ground for state action.38  We are not there yet, but it may soon be the 
case that simple gutter homophobia is as unspeakable as simple gutter 
racism.
Different societies, of course, have different sorts of things that are
politically unspeakable, and these differences may reflect very good 
reasons—reasons stemming, notably, from the particular pasts that have 
given rise to existing wounds within those societies. We have good
reason to think that what is speakable within one society—what might
not be reasonable, on Rawls’s tests, but what should perhaps be regarded 
as not worthy of scorn and marginalization—should be utter anathema
within another.  It is one thing for a talk radio host in New Jersey to refer 
to a disfavored group as human vermin; it is quite another for Valerie 
36. Henry Louis Gates Jr., Let Them Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at 
37, 45–46. 
37. Id. 
38. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  Indeed, there were “audible gasp[s]” in the courtroom 
when Justice Kagan read some of the purported rational bases offered for the Defense of
Marriage Act upon its passage in 1996. See Maura Dolan, Supreme Court Likely To
Strike Down DOMA, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2013), http://articles.latimes
.com/2013/mar/27/local/la-me-lanow-doma-react-gay-20130327 (describing the “intake of 



























Bemeriki to do it in Rwanda.39  It is, similarly, one thing for a British 
man to sing the praises of his nation’s heroes and quite another for a man
in Germany to sing the Horst Wessel Lied. The difference between the 
cases is not simply the legal effects—in the latter disjunct, in both cases,
legal consequences did or would follow from the acts of speech.40 The
difference is, instead, that the context and history of the words make
speaking them a very different thing, politically speaking.  Where there 
is a situation in which widespread human rights abuses are possible— 
where, notably, it is possible because it has already happened—we have 
a stronger reason to use the forces of repression to anathematize and
marginalize certain forms of speech.  Germany after the Holocaust has 
made Nazi symbolism and speech criminally prohibited, but it has also
created a form of social universe in which ideas redolent of Nazism are
to be recognized and condemned simply in virtue of that fact.  Nazi ideas 
are not literally unspeakable, of course—they continue to be spoken, all
too often—but they are politically unspeakable, in that they cannot and 
will not be taken seriously as part of the ongoing process of political 
discourse. They are unspeakable by virtue of this fact: they will not be 
given the basic respect owed to the political speech acts of a fellow citizen. 
With these ideas in mind, we might return to the issue of the ICC.
What exactly is it that the ICC is trying to do, if it is viewed as a discursive 
institution? If it is trying to anathematize, to make shameful, how 
exactly is that to be accomplished?  To answer these questions, we might
return briefly to the world of Domitian.  Domitian’s damnatio was
intended to remove Domitian from the world of political justification.41 
This was a world in which most dead Caesars could expect to dwell; 
former rulers became part of the set of institutions to which current
rulers could appeal, both in justifying their acts to the public and in the 
process of political negotiation.42  It is worth noting in this context that 
the army, which rather liked Domitian, tried unsuccessfully to have him 
made a god after his death; being a god was, rhetorically speaking, a
way of emphasizing that Domitian’s relevance should continue after his 
death.43  The damnatio, I think, might be viewed as having three related 
elements, none of them especially sharply distinguished from each other. 
The first is that it seeks to remove the idea that the person damned is an 
39. For more about Valerie Bemeriki, see Dele Olojede, When Words Could Kill, 
NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), May 4, 2004, at A37, available at 2004 WLNR 1088687. 
40. See Ben Camm-Jones, Apple Removes Nazi Anthem from German iTunes, 
TECHWORLD (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:06 PM), http://news.techworld.com/sme/3258503/apple-
removes-nazi-anthem-from-german-itunes/. 
41. See VARNER, supra note 3, at 111. 
42. Id. 
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authority—someone whose ideas are worth taking seriously because that
person is the one who produced them.  After the damnatio, Domitian was 
not someone who could be raised within the senate as a way of giving extra
weight to a particular view or policy.44 
The second is that it sought to remove the idea that the damned could
properly be understood as a hero. Roman emperors, naturally, had a 
lengthy afterlife as exemplars of virtue; the ones who were beloved
received the same glow of approbation as is currently assigned to modern
celebrities.45 On this view, the damnatio was intended to dispel the
tendency we have to think that the politically great are morally good.  To
say that someone was showing the political judgment of a Domitian,
after the damnatio, meant something quite different from what it might 
have meant to say that someone was acting like a Caesar or a Solon. 
The final thing I want to note is that the damnatio is intended to 
permanently cast a pall of disreputability over certain forms of political
argument—those employed by the damned.  Strictly speaking, of course,
we should not engage in ad hominem evaluation of arguments; each
argument should stand or fall on its merits.  In practice, naturally, people 
are not that rational, and the fact that the despised once made an 
argument counts as a reason to regard that argument as presumptively 
worthy of being despised—think, in this connection, of Godwin’s Law, 
the theory that every Internet argument eventually involves comparing
one’s opponent to Hitler.46  After all, Domitian was not merely a doer
but a figure who gave reasons for his actions, often rather complex ones 
involving the nature of religion and the infelicities of the Christian
faith.47  Eusebius records that the Christians exiled from Rome by 
Domitian were urged to return after his death; this was done, we might 
think, not because the Christians were beloved but in part because
Domitian himself was so hated that his patterns of reasoning should be 
regarded as presumptively erroneous.48 
44. See VARNER, supra note 3, at 2. 
45. See WILLIAM E. DUNSTAN, ANCIENT ROME 317 (2011) (“[Trajan’s] reputation 
as the model ruler lived on down the centuries and eventually reached legendary
proportions—Dante singled him out from all other non-Christian emperors for a place in 
Paradise . . . .”).
46. Godwin’s Law Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/340583 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
47. See DUNSTAN, supra note 45, at 306–07. 
48. See  EUSEBIUS, THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH FROM CHRIST TO CONSTANTINE 





























We may leap forward now from Domitian to Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
I believe the ICC’s condemnation of Lubanga has a strong similarity to
these three forms of authoritative condemnation.  In the first instance,
the idea that Lubanga is the antithesis of a hero is rather obviously the
focus of the judgment against him.  In its sentencing decision, the court 
emphasized the gruesome nature of his crime and the innocence of the
children he sent to their deaths.49  This should not be a surprise; the 
moral depravity of a criminal is relevant to sentencing, both within domestic
jurisprudence and within the ICC. What I want to suggest, though, is
that the justifying purpose of the ICC here is found in precisely this
communication of moral disapprobation.  In domestic jurisprudence, we 
might think that whether or not someone watching the trial regards the 
defendant as heroic is largely a matter of irrelevance.  Many people, for 
example, still write to Charles Manson; the civil society of America persists.50 
In the ICC, though, the communication that these acts were not heroic— 
that Lubanga sought out the most vulnerable members of his society and 
destroyed them for selfish gain—seems to be the best way of justifying 
the enterprise itself. The ICC is trying, through what it says and the 
meaning of what it does, to send the message that Lubanga is not just
worthy of being punished by the court but worthy of being seen as 
contemptible by his own society.
I think similar things might be said about the other two aspects of the 
damnatio I have identified.  The ICC’s decisions emphasized that Lubanga
was, in fact, a reasonable being.51  In the ICC’s conviction, the court
depicted Lubanga as a political leader who built a thriving party with a 
platform he personally helped create.52  This emphasis is not simply to 
make the case that Lubanga was no victim of circumstance.  Instead, it is
to emphasize that Lubanga himself was a figure who used reason, and
who used it badly.  As such, we have reason to think that the specific ways
in which he argued—the justifications he offered for warfare and for his 
decisions within warfare—are arguments we ought to regard as shameful, 
presumptively not just wrong but evil.  Indeed, the ICC does try to
delegitimize Lubanga as both a model for political agency and a provider of
political reasons. He is neither hero nor authority; instead, reasons he 
49. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision 
on Sentence, ¶¶ 36–50, 57–78 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 
1438370.pdf.
50. David Macaray, Charles Manson and Me, HUFFINGTON POST CRIME BLOG 
(Oct. 4, 2011, 5:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-macaray/charles-manson-
and-me_b_994638.html. 
51. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶¶ 54–56. 
52. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment,
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provided for political action should be removed from the world of 
respectable political speech. 
That, I think, is the message that the court is trying to send.  Of course, 
it is true that domestic courts say similar things.  I believe, however, that 
the difference is that domestic courts rightly regard this sort of discursive
practice as an element added to an independently justified practice of
legitimate punishment. We punish, that is, because it is right to do so,
and if that punishment communicates what ought to be communicated to
others, then so much the better.  If not—if no message can be communicated, 
for example, because a desert island society is about to dissolve—then
we should not worry.  The expressive function of punishment is a means 
by which domestic societies might make themselves better off, by using 
an already-justified practice for purposes of social reprobation.
Internationally, in contrast, I think this is in fact the best story we have
about why these institutions ought to be set up. This is, again, a theory
of discontinuity; despite the similar appearance of the two forms of
practice, they are justified in rather different ways.  The purpose of the 
punishment of Lubanga, on this view, is not to give Lubanga what he 
deserves; to be blunt, no human institution could do that.  Nor is the purpose
to directly incentivize good behavior by imposing a sort of tax on future 
wrongdoers.  Lubanga was not effectively deterred by the existence of 
the ICC, and it seems to be quite unlikely that future Lubangas will face 
a different set of incentives.  The ICC is speaking neither to Lubanga nor
to those who might choose to emulate him.  Instead, it is seeking to create a
new form of constitutional community—a constitution, again, that is as 
much a matter of shared political will as of legal institutions. This
community is defined, as all are, by a set of heroes and reasons and
arguments that can be appealed to in public political discourse. The ICC 
is best justified, on this view, as a way of setting limits to this discourse 
after the radical failure of that community to follow the dictates of morality. 
The ICC is, again, a thoroughly political institution, not political in the 
discreditable sense—despite the criticisms I offer above; the ICC is not
to be dismissed as parochial—but political in that its proper target is the 
creation of a new political community.53 
53. Scott Shapiro and Michael Ramsey have both pressed upon me the idea that
the ICC might be justified as a sort of precommitment strategy: the ICC forces signatory
states to commit to the punishment of those who violate human rights, and the ICC’s 
most basic threat is to take over that punishing function if the state drags its feet. This is 


















   




   
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
Is this analysis plausible when deployed as a justification for the ICC? 
Whether it is depends upon factual arguments I have no way of making; 
I am not an empirical scholar, and I try to avoid pretending to be one. 
I do have to say that I find it not obviously implausible and believe there 
is some minimal amount of evidence from history that might give us 
reason to accept it.  Compare, for instance, the reaction of Germany and 
Japan to the recognition of atrocity following the Second World War. 
The denazification process was wide ranging within Germany and 
included both legal trials against individual Germans and the extirpation 
of Nazi symbols and ideas from German social life.54  Germany has made 
Holocaust denial unspeakable, both legally and morally; the legal concept
of volksverhetzung has made Nazi ideas legally condemnable under 
some circumstances,55 but the trials at Nuremberg began a more broad 
social process making such ideas socially monstrous as well.56 To diminish
the moral depravity of the Holocaust in modern Germany is to make
oneself unworthy of engagement as a political agent. 
Japan, in contrast, has proven to be more resistant to the recognition of 
the atrocities occurring during the occupation of Manchuria. Social
attitudes toward past atrocities are complex, but the idea that such
atrocities are potentially defensible is a live one within Japanese political
culture. A Japanese mayor made headlines in May 2013 for defending 
the sexual slavery of Korean women during the Second World War; 
such practices, he said, were necessary for military discipline.57  To be 
fair, there was some outrage at this statement, both at home and abroad, 
and we may be heartened by this fact.58 We should, however, be equally
dismayed that the statement was made at all. 
what it is that the court does; why is the court allowed to punish individual people?
What does it hope to gain by doing so?  If the ICC were simply a treaty that authorized
harsh treatment against states that were unable or unwilling to punish their own, we 
might have been satisfied with any number of ways in which this harsh treatment might
be doled out. The use of criminal procedure against individual lawbreakers would be 
one of any number of possible ways of prompting states to do their jobs.  I believe, even
if we conceive of the ICC as a precommitment strategy, we ought to conceive of the 
court as a body that uses legal norms against individual persons and see what reason that 
court might have for doing so. 
54. See, e.g., FREDERICK TAYLOR, EXORCISING HITLER: THE OCCUPATION AND 
DENAZIFICATION OF GERMANY (2011). 
55. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt 
[BGBL.] 3322, as amended, § 130(4) (Ger.). 
56. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 54 (chronicling the postwar occupation and 
denazification of Germany). 
57. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Women Sent to Brothels Aided Japan, Mayor Says, N.Y. 
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It is difficult, if not impossible, to say why this difference between 
Japan and Germany should have emerged.  One factor might be the 
comparative weight placed by the Allies upon the Nuremberg tribunal, 
rather than upon the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.59 
These latter trials also included a comparatively greater grant of sovereign 
immunity; notably, the emperor and his family were entirely free from any
threat of prosecution.60  There was, perhaps, more cynicism in the
conduct of these trials, as well; Shiro Ishii, responsible for vivisection and 
other human experimentation at the covert Japanese military biowarfare
research program Unit 731, was allowed to go free in exchange for the 
medical data his torture had produced.61  I think it at least plausible that
an international trial, properly conducted, may have the effect of producing
the right sort of shame following evil by marginalizing and shaming
those who perpetrated the worst of it.  I also believe, though I acknowledge
I am not able to adequately ground my contention, that Nuremberg had 
some part to play in setting the framework for what can and cannot be 
said in modern Germany.  As a final point, I am convinced that if we 
want to justify the ICC, we have reason to look to this sort of function, 
rather than to more traditional conceptions of punishment.62 
All of this is to say only that the ICC might have a role to play in 
setting the stage for modern democratic states to emerge after atrocity. 
We might worry that this ignores the central concern about punitive 
institutions: whether they have the right to punish at all.  What I propose
here is that the ICC is properly understood as a sort of discursive institution,
justified with reference to its ability to create a democratic community. 
What this might seem to obscure is the fact that this discourse involves 
59. See MADOKA FUTAMURA, WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
THE TOKYO TRIAL AND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 8–11 (2008). 
60. See id. at 63, 121. 
61. See DANIEL BARENBLATT, A PLAGUE UPON HUMANITY: THE SECRET GENOCIDE 
OF AXIS JAPAN’S GERM WARFARE OPERATION 207, 210–11, 223 (2004); Nicholas D. 
Kristof, Japan Confronting Gruesome War Atrocity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, at A1. 
62. I would also be cautious before asserting that the approach I offer here is the 
only way in which these institutions might be justified; it is always possible that some
other sorts of considerations—perhaps, the need to acknowledge the drive for vengeance 
while minimizing the damage that drive creates—might also be invoked in justification
of the ICC.  I am skeptical about the ability of such ideas to ground the court as it exists, 
but I do not here try to argue that these ideas could not do the job.  I am grateful to Don




















    
  
  
   
 
putting people like Lubanga in jail—in his case, for fourteen years.63 
What right do we have to do that? Is this not simply another case of 
using people for the benefits of others?  It is to these worries that I will 
now turn.
III. RADICAL EVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY 
The worry I have identified above is a powerful one.  Those of us who
are deontic thinkers tend to worry about deterrence-based theories of 
punishment precisely because they tend to justify causing harm to some 
with reference to the benefits given to others. Rawls’s criticism of 
utilitarianism began with just this fact: utilitarians cannot take seriously
the separateness of persons and therefore cannot accept the moral
inviolability of the individual.64  I do not mean to contravene this fact. 
Indeed, in the area of domestic punishment, I accept that we cannot 
justify causing harm to one simply with reference to the greater well-
being of another.  What can we say, then, about the legitimacy of using
Lubanga’s person as a way of making a constitutional point? 
There are two things I want to emphasize here about why this might 
not be as morally problematic as it might at first seem.  The first is the 
transitional context in which this punishment is occurring; the second is 
the notion that radical evil might give rise, in this context, to legitimate 
forms of rights forfeiture. These two ideas are deeply related, but I will 
try to discuss them separately. 
We can begin with the idea that the punishment of Lubanga is 
occurring within a context of transitional justice—transitional between
the absence of legitimate government institutions and their presence.
This is an inevitable part of the ICC’s mandate; it has no role to play
when government institutions are able and willing to do their job. It is
not allowed, for example, to simply take over an existing set of
legitimate institutions because it might do the job they do better.65  This
fact is hardly news; we are aware that the place within which the ICC
acts must necessarily be one in which the institutions of government
have been absent.  What I want to emphasize, though, is that the idea of 
transition has two sides. The first is that we are transitioning toward just
governance. The second is that we are transitioning away from anarchy 
and lawlessness and importantly, that we have not yet in fact entirely 
escaped from those circumstances. I do not want to oversell the claim; I 
63. See Marlise Simons, Congolese Warlord Draws First Sentence from International 
Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at A4. 
64. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27–29 (1971). 
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do not think that the ICC always acts against a backdrop of pure anarchy. 
Very few places, however badly run, have ever had that character. But,
insofar as it is acting after atrocity and in place of weak institutions that 
are insufficient to defend the domestic rule of law, the ICC is involved in
acting against a backdrop in which those domestic institutions are anemic
and ineffectual at best.  I think it is important to recognize that where there
is the absence of such governing institutions, we may have the right to do 
to people’s bodies what we would not ordinarily be able to consider 
doing. After all, just war theory presupposes that there is a difference in
what we can do to people during warfare and what we can do to them 
while in a state of civil society.66  Indeed, although this is somewhat 
controversial, it seems true that those who are war criminals might in fact 
be justly subject to forms of violence we could not even conceive of 
accepting as part of civil society—including the imposition of a violent
death without due process.  Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau 
believed that the appropriate response to the Nazi hierarchy was 
summary execution.67  Although I believe we have all benefitted from
the existence of the Nuremberg tribunals, I do not think Morgenthau was
mistaken in his belief that such execution would have been no moral
wrong against those executed.68  The simple fact is that warfare is
different and that the ways in which people must treat each other may be 
different as well. When it acts to transition away from war, the ICC still 
acts with one foot in the rules and practices of modern warfare. It is 
setting up a constitutional system, not acting within one. As such, it is 
possibly true that those who—like Lubanga—are to be used to make a 
political point have no particular right to be free from such treatment. 
To be clear, I do not want to make the case that people like Lubanga 
have no rights.  They have the same moral rights as all persons.  But I do
want to emphasize that there is a difference between the rights we are 
morally entitled to expect within a domestic political system and the 
66. See generally ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR: A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN DOCTRINE (1960) (discussing justifications for the use of force). 
67. The “Morgenthau plan” went beyond simply the summary execution of the 
Nazi leadership and entailed the permanent destruction of Germany as a military or
industrial power. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS 
OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 151, 157 (2000). 
68. See id. at 152 (“Morgenthau spent much of 1944 bombarding the White House
with proposals for harsh treatment of Germany after the war—part and parcel of which 
was the summary execution of many Nazi war criminals.  He had no patience for plodding






   
    











    
  
   
comparatively thin rights we have under international human rights law.
Those who transgress against domestic law may have a right, by virtue 
of their status as objects of that complex system of laws, to be treated as
equal in comparison to other persons coerced by that law; they may have 
a strong moral right to be treated in ways that do not depend upon a 
showing of benefits to others.  Those who transgress against international
law, in contrast, violate those norms that are themselves definitive of
what can count as a legitimate system of domestic law.69  They do, insofar
as it is within their power, act to bring us back to a system of war.  We
may be allowed to use tools and ideas within war that would not be
acceptable within a system of domestic law.  We should not pretend, in 
other words, that the ICC is acting against a backdrop akin to that of the 
domestic legal system; the ICC acts only when that most basic set of 
moral guarantees has ceased to exist and thus acts only when the world 
has returned to war.70  We should not think that those who act to bring us
out of war are obligated to act as if they have already done so; we cannot 
confuse the moment of founding with the rules that hold sway after that 
founding.  To use Arthur Applbaum’s pithy saying, “All foundings are 
forced.”71  This fact may permit us to use Lubanga in a manner that we 
could not imagine for even the most heinous domestic criminal.
This brings us to the second aspect of international criminal law worth 
examining.  Those who are punished under the ICC have committed acts 
that are best described as morally shocking—not simply illegal or worthy of
condemnation, but radically evil.  It is possible for us to think that such 
people—who have systematically rejected and ignored the human dignity of
others—no longer have the right to morally reject the sorts of treatment I 
imagine here.  They would be, at the very least, caught in a sort of
performative contradiction; in protesting their treatment, they insist upon 
a principle—the moral relevance of humanity—that they themselves 
have consistently refused to uphold.  I want to be very careful here; I do 
not think that ideas like this license us in treating those we punish in 
domestic law as having forfeited their right to treatment as a moral 
equal. This is the case domestically because the institutions are trying to 
punish, which involves the attempt to do something that—on the retributive 
view at least—involves treating the criminal as a moral agent entitled to 
69. For a justification of this way of looking at international law, see ANNA STILZ, 
LIBERAL LOYALTY: FREEDOM, OBLIGATION, AND THE STATE (2011). 
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
71. Arthur Isak Applbaum, Forcing a People To Be Free, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
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equality.72  It is also worth noting, I think, that domestic legal institutions—
in a stable democratic state—can survive treating even the worst persons 
with respect.  Internationally, though, we might think that the ICC is
doing something that necessarily involves justifying harsh treatment
with reference toward the good of some future political community, in
which the criminal may not indeed have any part.  If this is permissible,
it might be because the criminal in question has committed acts of a 
character sufficient to thoroughly lose the right to be free from being so
used. Christopher Heath Wellman has recently proposed this as a picture of
punishment more generally; on this analysis, punishment is permissible 
in virtue of the rights the criminal has forfeited by his choice to act
within crime.73  I am not confident that I accept this as a picture of domestic
punishment—I am also not confident I do not—but I do think that it 
seems a plausible picture of how we might understand why we are 
morally permitted to put Lubanga in jail.  Lubanga, after all, is not being 
punished as part of an ongoing system of legal punishment, defended by
a domestic state as part of its process of self-rule.  He is, instead, engaging 
in an illegitimate act of war.  When Lubanga acts against the most basic 
norms of international law and undermines the rights that individuals 
have under those norms, he removes from himself the right to complain
when we use force against him.  If we use that force as part of the process of
building a new society, in which Lubanga and those who would follow 
him have no part, he has no complaint against us.74 
These ideas are jarring.  Most of us recoil from the idea that we might 
punish some with a view toward the edification of others.  I would note, 
however, that nothing in what I have said here allows us to go further
than what the ICC is currently doing in seeking to impose punishment
upon individuals only after a fair trial. Nothing in these ideas allows us 
to engage in punishment against the innocent; only in actually committing a
crime against the basic rights of others does an individual become a 
legitimate subject of punishment, and the criminal trial is required for us 
72. E.g., Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the 
Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1184 (2009). 
73. See Christopher Heath Wellman, The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment, 
122 ETHICS 371, 371–76 (2012). 
74. Lori Watson pointed out that part of the process might involve the testimony
of the victims of such abusers as part of the process of extirpation; I have focused on the 
role of the accused and of the institution of the court itself, but I agree with Watson that 
the voice of the victim might be a valuable part of the process of rebuilding a social world in


























to be confident in our belief that this individual is legally and factually
guilty.  Moreover, the ICC is duty bound to demonstrate what the rule of
law looks like so as to create a model by which the rule of law might be 
created. I have said here that the ICC is justified, in part, because it acts
within a context in which law has ceased to hold.75  However, nothing in
that context permits the court to act contrary to the morality of individual 
rights that animates law itself. The court may not be justified with
reference to the same ideas that justify domestic courts.  It should, however, 
hold itself to similar standards of procedural and substantive fairness. 
All of this is necessarily a rough sketch, but I hope it might suffice to 
give some plausibility to the idea that the ICC’s best justification might 
have very little to do with punishment as ordinarily understood.  If 
punishment is justified in the ways we ordinarily try to justify it, the ICC 
may not have much to recommend it.  If we think of the ICC instead as a 
form of constitutional act—as the use of the language and procedure of 
modern legal punishment in service of the constitutional project—then
the ICC may be better equipped to present itself as justifiable.  The ICC,
on this analysis, sets out the future of a society after atrocity by seeking 
to invoke the shame that is conventionally associated with punishment in 
service of the constitutional project.  For domestic courts, it is the sentence
and harsh treatment that make punishment what it is.  For the ICC, I 
suggest, the most important part of the process is the verdict itself.  What
matters most, morally speaking, is not that bad people have a bad time 
but that such bad people are forever damned as unworthy of admiration
and emulation.
What could we take away from these ideas?  I will conclude with only 
two ideas that might emerge from this Article.  The first is that the ICC
is justified, if it is, with reference to what is likely to emerge from it.
The justification I offer here is sufficient to justify the ICC only if the 
ICC and institutions like it actually are able to marginalize and stigmatize
those who are evil. What evidence there is about this proposition is sketchy. 
It is disheartening to see that William Ruto, recently elected as Kenya’s 
Deputy President, was able to use his ICC indictment as a form of
credentialing.76  This suggests, I think, that the ICC should be extremely 
careful in how it presents itself. If we are seeking to engage in punishment
as we ordinarily understand it, we have some prudential reason to avoid 
triumphalism, be modest in our claims, and so on. If our goal is instead 
the creation of a constitutional project, we have a much stronger moral 
reason to be careful about how much we think we can do.  Those who
75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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are punished by an international body will be stigmatized only if those 
within their society accept that body’s right to stigmatize.  This suggests 
that the ICC should be careful about overreaching. Even if it were not 
already jurisdictionally limited in its ability to replace the deliberations 
of domestic political societies, it would have a strong moral reason to 
avoid replacing such deliberations.  A principle of subsidiarity, in other 
words, seems defensible not just legally but morally.
This leads me to my final point: we should resist the idea that the ICC 
is a court like any other court.  Indeed, this has been what I have been
trying to establish all along. What I want to say here is that the 
discontinuity between the ICC and other courts should be sufficient to
make us think that the ICC is best understood as something genuinely
extraordinary.  We should not be misled by the superficial similarity 
between the ICC and other forms of legal institutions.  The ICC is, on 
my analysis, something that exists only when domestic law fails. In 
other words, it is best understood as having relevance only under 
circumstances of moral catastrophe.  There is some controversy between
different scholars as to the ambitions that the ICC should eventually 
have; should it limit itself to the core human abuses, or should it try to 
become something grander?77  I believe we are right to regard the ICC as 
something much more like an emergency response to an emergency 
situation; it is not a domestic court writ large but something more like a 
standing army—an institution ready and waiting for the tragic circumstances 
in which its powers become relevant.  I cannot defend this conclusion
here. I think what I have said, though, may give us reason to think that 
the ICC involves doing things—and saying things through that doing— 
that are genuinely extraordinary and that should not be regarded as the 
simple international extension of domestic law.  Once again, though, I 
cannot defend such conclusions; I will close simply by reasserting them.
The ICC, as I understand it, may be best justified with reference to the 
ways in which it reshapes the future of a domestic society.  An
international criminal court understood in such a manner might be more 
modest in how much it thinks it can accomplish; it might also, however,
be more justifiable than it would be if read as a simple institution of
legal punishment. 
77. I am grateful to Jamie Mayerfeld for discussion of these issues, even though
he would not likely agree with the conclusions.
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